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Abstract 
The global corporate scandals in the banking industry have gained the government’s attention and other 
regulatory agencies on the importance of corporate governance, inducing legislation to prevent similar 
occurrences. Iraq has an emerging economy and corporate governance practices to establish and maintain a 
quality corporate culture. The study examined corporate governance and political influence on the financial 
reporting quality (FRQ) of 34 Iraqi banks listed under the 2015 – 2019 stock exchange. Specifically, the study 
provided a critical literature review on past studies to identify the strength and weaknesses and the literature gap. 
The study also used secondary data from financial reports. A total sample of 170 observation data was obtained 
as the analysis unit, selected through market capitalisation. Additionally, multiple linear regression was used to 
analyse the data using the Stata software. The results showed a positive and significant relationship between 
board size and FRQ. Conversely, board independence and audit committee independence had insignificant 
relationships with FRQ. Based on the ownership structure, managerial ownership significantly affected FRQ, 
whereas the political influence negatively impacted FRQ. Ultimately, the study contributes to the limited 
literature on the relationship between corporate governance and FRQ in Iraq’s developing economy. 
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1. Introduction 
A listed company’s financial report is a crucial channel for existing and potential investors to make viable 
decisions. Hence, corporate governance could positively impact the FRQ. Recently, FRQ has gained increasing 
attention, being pervasive in all spheres of human activity (Huynh, 2020; Masud, Kaium, Bae, Manzanares, & 
Kim, 2019). Besides, the wave of financial reporting scandals in the international community has raised 
criticisms on the FRQ. Global corporate failure and financial statement manipulation are recurring phenomena 
that failed to guarantee the credibility and transparency of financial statements (Huynh, 2020; Hermanto, 2019; 
Arieftiara & Utama, 2018). Many studies have also highlighted the challenge of FRQ in financial institutions, 
particularly the banking industry. Despite various measures implemented by the regulatory agencies, poor FRQ 
still exist. Ismael and Mohammadi (2017) mentioned that FRQ depends on governance principles in developed 
and developing countries. Due to failure in financial disclosure, organisations have highlighted the need to 
improve FRQ and strengthen the control of managers by establishing strong governance structures. 
The relationship between corporate governance and FRQ has been discussed extensively in developed 
countries, emphasising specific governance mechanisms: board structure (Klai & Omri, 2011); auditors’ 
effectiveness (Huynh, 2020; Rich, 2009; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005); director shareholding (Sánchez‐Ballesta & 
García‐Meca, 2007); ownership structure (Zulaikah, Larasati, & Harymawan, 2019; Han, 2005). Nevertheless, 
developing stock markets are different from the developed stock market regarding the ownership structure, 
corporate governance code, and development stages (Arieftiara & Utama, 2018). Thus, research focused on 
corporate governance and FRQ in emerging economies with distinctive characteristics about corporate 
regulations, control and capital allocation in the sector. Nonetheless, the area has not been comprehensively 
examined in Iraq.  
The Iraqi constitution did not mention corporate governance, specifically investment law, capital market 
law, joint-stock companies law, and accounting and auditing standards (Doski, 2015; Najim, 2013). Al-Obeidi 
(2011) stated that corporate governance implementation is very low due to no issuing or establishing corporate 
governance codes and no relevant local laws determining corporate governance mechanisms. Additionally, 
limited evidence was found on the relationship between corporate governance and emerging economies such as 
Iraq. The study referred to Doski (2015), Khudair (2012), and Al-Obeidi (2011) on the importance of Iraqi 
corporate governance. 
Iraq is an interesting case study on how corporate governance impacts FRQ due to many reasons based on 
the trending issues in Iraq, namely: improving the importance of corporate purposes; better board oversight of 
corporate culture and human capital management; a more expansive view of board diversity including ethnicity 
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and race; companies facing a wider form of activism; and a greater focus on environmental, social and 
governance (ESG). Therefore, the study examines and identifies the link between corporate governance 
mechanisms and FRQ in board effectiveness, ownership structure, audit quality and political influence in Iraq 
financial sectors. Accordingly, the study objectives are as follows: 
i. To examine the influence of board effectiveness and FRQ in Iraq banking institutions. 
ii. To investigate the relationship between ownership structure and FRQ in Iraq banking institutions. 
iii. To examine the impact of political influence on the FRQ in Iraq banking institutions. 
 
2. Literatures Review 
2.1 FRQ 
The FRQ has gained considerable interest globally. Significantly, FRQ solves the increasing concern of existing 
and potential investors to increase public trust in business (Mbir, Agyemang, & Tackie, 2020). Companies 
should improve the quality of reports for fast-tracking information, which impacts emerging risks of future 
business strategies. Hence, the risks organisations are exposed to, the actions that prevent uncertainties, the 
carrying value of assets and the recognition of liabilities due to reporting failure undermines trust in business 
(Hermanto, 2019; Arieftiara & Utama, 2018). Consequently, management can miss the potential impact, 
nontransparent or not managing effectively. 
The conceptual framework of 2010 financial reporting emphasised that financial reports present users with 
useful information in decision making to provide resources to the company (IASB, 2017). Trai Kha, Trung, and 
Dung (2018) categorised financial reporting as follows: financial statements, accompanying footnote disclosures, 
annual reports issued by shareholders, other financial information on the firms’ website, and any prospectus to 
investors regarding the firm’s issuance of securities. Past studies stated that financial reporting transparency is 
significantly and positively related to the proportion of outside directors on the board, the audit committee and 
the outside directors with financial expertise (Mohammed, Sanusi, Noordin, & Harjito, 2016). Consequently, 
shareholders may appoint more outside directors when the information environment is friendly and transparent 
to improve the FRQ. Meanwhile, other studies have measured the FRQ using various methods. For instance, 
Beest, Braam, and Boelens (2009) explained the methods of measuring FRQ through the accrual method, value 
relevance method, and specific factors in the annual reports. Thus, the comprehensive measurement tools of 
FRQ encompass the complete annual financial and non-financial reports. The study also highlighted value 
relevance and accrual methods, mainly focusing on accounting financial figures to examine the FRQ. Therefore, 
this study focused on the annual report elements to determine the impact of adequate information in the annual 
report and users’ accurate decision-making. 
 
2.2. Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Corporate governance is a multifaceted subject to prevent entrepreneurs and owners from abusing on behalf of 
the organisation. According to Fekadu (2015), corporate governance ensures proper business governance and 
compliance with all governance norms by regulatory bodies to benefit all interested parties, including society 
(Almanasir & Shivaraj 2017; Ene & Bello, 2016). Paul, Ebelechukwu, and Yakubu (2015) mentioned that 
corporate governance involves ensuring accountability and transparency, building capability, and ensuring an 
effective channel of information disclosure that foster better corporate performance and enhance the FRQ. 
Companies require corporate governance, which needs a good system to help build shareholder confidence 
and ensure all stakeholders are treated equally and appropriately. Besides, Mahrani and Soewarno (2018) 
expressed that a governance system provides shareholders effective protection to recover investments effectively 
and reasonably. Furthermore, Huyanh (2020) stated that corporate governance plays an essential role as 
improved practices are vital to attract investment opportunities and stimulate social welfare and economic 
growth and sustainability (Huynh, 2020; Hermanto, 2019; Antonio, Laela, & Darmawan, 2019). The study added 
that effective governance is the communication channel between managers and shareholders that are well 
established and clear; risk management measures are in place and effectively formed strategic directions. 
Terjesen, Couto and Francisco (2016) reviewed corporate governance on the role of financial reporting in 
resolving agency conflicts among company directors, managers and capital providers. Specifically, governance 
is a set of contracts that assists and aligns managers’ and shareholders’ interests and information asymmetry in 
the agency problems. The study revealed that financial reporting is valuable because contracts are more efficient 
when two parties commit themselves to a more transparent information environment. Mahrani and Soewarno 
(2018) suggested that financial reporting can reduce information asymmetries that impair the efficiency of 
essential governance mechanisms.  
2.2.1 Board Effectiveness and Financial Reporting Quality 
The study analysed the relationship between board effectiveness and FRQ. Past studies have reported the 
importance of board characteristics in ensuring a high level of FRQ. Hence, board characteristics such as board 
size, board diversity and board independence affect the FRQ level in organisations (Hermanto, 2019; Mahrani & 
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Soewarno, 2018; Kukah, Amidu, & Abor, 2016; Fakhfakh, 2016; Doski, 2015; Chen, Cheng, & Wang, 2015; 
Nelson & Devi, 2013). Therefore, the study is divided into the following subsections: 
2.2.2 Board Size and FRQ 
Many studies have discussed the importance of board size with the firms’ reporting quality. For example, Vafeas 
(2000) revealed that the larger the board size, the less effective the monitoring responsibility as it might spread 
among all directors. Different opinions might hinder larger boards from reaching decisions to produce a high-
quality financial statement. Due to the size of the BOD, less personal responsibility is levelled on each director. 
Additionally, Mbir et al. (2020) deduced that smaller board sizes tend to have a high level of FRQ. Beasley, Blay, 
Lewellen, and McAllister (2018) also established that the increase in board size could encourage more fraudulent 
financial activities. Therefore, the study proposed the following: 
H1 There is a significant relationship between board size and FRQ in the Iraqi banking sector. 
2.2.3 Board Gender Diversity and FRQ 
From the agency theory perspective, female directors usually incorporate extensive ideas that increase board 
independence and improve the FRQ (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Moreover, including female directors in an 
organisation forms a high sense of responsibility in the decision-making process (Pucheta-Martínez, Bel-Oms, & 
Olcina-Sempere, 2018; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008). Kukah et al. (2016) showed the negative relationship 
between gender diversity, board diversity and FRQ. Furthermore, Mbir et al. (2020) and Gavious, Segev, and 
Yosef (2012) suggested that women on the board negatively affect earnings management, implying a significant 
positive relationship between board diversity and FRQ. Hence, the study presented the following: 
H2 There is a significant relationship between board diversity and FRQ in the Iraqi banking sector. 
2.2.4 Board Independence and FRQ 
Numerous studies have identified board independence as one of the corporate governance constructs that 
improve the FRQ. According to Chen et al. (2015), higher board independence monitors the manipulation in 
financial statements because relative to the works of dependent board members, the executive board member’s 
work does not experience familiarity threat. Additionally, the more independent members on boards, the lower 
the propensity of earnings management and the higher the organisation’s FRQ level. Meanwhile, Cornett, 
Cornett, and Marcus (2008) indicated that BOD independence provides greater experience to the company 
regarding their monitoring activities. Similarly, Osma and Noguer (2007) revealed that board members 
independent of management are crucial to an organisation’s governance, mainly for discretionary accounting 
accruals prevention. Moreover, Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2005) highlighted the effectiveness of monitoring 
the board’s responsibility on the number of independent directors, proposing a higher representation of 
independent directors due to independence and effectiveness in monitoring duties and responsibility. Therefore, 
the following hypothesised: 
H3 There is a significant relationship between Board Independence and FRQ in the Iraqi banking sector. 
2.2.5 Audit Committee and FRQ 
The audit committee is the standing committee comprising non-executive and independent BOD. Rezaee (2004) 
mentioned that the audit committee’s role and responsibility are to monitor the integrity, reliability and quality of 
the financial reporting process without interfering in the managerial functions and the decisions on the financial 
statement preparation. Notably, audit committee report significantly impact the FRQ. Atu, Omimi-Ejoor, Atu, 
and Abusomwan (2013) also revealed that the audit committee’s qualification adds to the FRQ. Most listed 
companies in Iraq have professional members on the board. Hence, the study examines the audit committee’s 
function on whether it will improve the FRQ. Therefore, the study hypothesised as follows: 
H4 There is a significant relationship between audit committee independence and FRQ in the Iraqi banking 
sector. 
2.2.6 Ownership Structure and FRQ 
The principal-agent relationship separates ownership from those managing the business, in which shareholders 
sign a contract to engage managers to perform assigned functions. Meanwhile, the shareholders and managers 
incentives do not align as profit from the manager effort goes to the shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
suggested that the differences in the managers and shareholders’ interests encourage the managers to take drastic 
steps critical to the shareholders. Hence, the severity of the agency issues depends on whether the ownership 
structure is concentrated or dispersed. Based on the ownership concentration, agency issues are prevented and 
lower the problem from dispersed ownership structure as the shareholders can easily monitor the low performing 
managers. 
Mashhadani and Fatlawi (2012) reported that the ownership concentration reduces earnings manipulation in 
Iraq companies. Hence, the study includes managerial ownership and institutional ownership. Managerial 
ownership is a corporate governance mechanism to minimise the agency problem and improve the FRQ. 
Consequently, managers work in line with the shareholders’ interests. Meanwhile, managers develop agency cost 
by over-investing or under-investing the available cashflow (Hillawi, 2012). Hence, shareholders are at a 
disadvantage as the managers pay more monitoring, bonding and residual cost for the organisation. Nevertheless, 
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the incentive of the managers and shareholders can align through managerial ownership as the higher the stake of 
the manager, the higher the profit the manager shares with other shareholders. Besides, institutional ownership is 
an ownership structure that improves the quality of financial reporting in Iraq. Ferreira and Matos (2008) stated 
that firms with a larger percentage of institutional shareholders discharge their duties and responsibilities better 
with value and lower capital expenditure and improve the FRQ of the firms. Therefore, the study presents the 
following: 
H5 There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and FRQ in the Iraqi banking sector. 
H6 There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and FRQ in the Iraqi banking sector. 
2.2.7 Political Influence and FRQ 
Numerous agency issues occur when there is government influence in the firm or with politicians as board 
members. Roe (2003) suggested that the pressures from politicians can induce managers to steer from profit 
maximising goals, affecting the company’s accounting system. Meanwhile, politicians may influence managers 
to report selective information and present the annual reports in their best interest (Ghazalia & Shafie, 2019; 
Jamil, 2020). Kalabeke, Sadiq, and Keong (2019) revealed that agency problems might create substandard 
financial reports or drastically reduce accounting information that is disclosed, reducing the quality of financial 
reporting. Several studies have also indicated that political influence negatively impacts the FRQ (Jamil, 2020; 
Ghazalia & Shafie, 2019; Kalabeke et al., 2019; Sadiq, Mohamad, & Kwong, 2019). Belkaoui (2004) reported 
that political influence has a low impact on the firms’ earnings quality. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) also 
proved low financial disclosure in the firms with political influence. Thus, the following is proposed: 
H7 There is a significant negative relationship between Political Influence and FRQ in the Iraqi banking 
sector. 
 
2.3. Theoretical Review 
The study adopted two essential theories (agency theory and political theory) showing the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and FRQ, specifically in Iraq’s emerging economy with no proper regulation 
on the corporate governance codes. The agency theory is the principal-agent problem by Mitnick (1970), which 
occurs when the agent makes decisions on behalf of the principal. Past studies on corporate governance 
mechanisms provide two factors of agency theory (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2019). Firstly, the companies are 
minimised to two participants: managers and shareholders whose interests are considered consistent and clear. 
Secondly, humans are disinclined and have the self-interest to sacrifice their interests for the interests of others. 
Hence, accounting effectively minimises the agency cost via written contracts tied to the accounting system as a 
vital element of corporate governance structures (Idowu & Adegbie, 2020). Therefore, if the manager is 
compensated for their performance such as accounting profits, they could increase profits to increase bonus or 
remuneration by selecting an accounting method that might increase the profits. 
The political theory involves developing voting support from shareholders instead of purchasing voting 
power based on George Holland Sabine. Thus, political influence in corporate governance can direct corporate 
governance within the firm. Consequently, the public interest is far reserved as the politicians participate in the 
decision making of the organisation, considering the cultural challenges (Inam, 2019). The theory also describes 
allocating corporate power, privileges and profits, determined through the favour of politician board members, 
which may eventually negatively affect the organisation’s FRQ. Therefore, the theory may influence the 
governance developments as Iraq does not have an adequate and viable corporate code of ethics guiding the 
organisations.  
 
3. Research Data and Methods 
The study examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, political influence and FRQ of 
listed banks under the Iraqi Stock Exchange for five years (2015 – 2019). The study also explains the model 
specification, the data, variable measurement and the estimation procedures of data analysis as stated below: 
 
3.1. Model Specification 
The study employed a baseline model for the relationship between corporate governance structure and FRQ and 
the relationship between political influence and FRQ. Based on Mbir et al. (2020) and Armstrong, Barth, 
Jagolinzer, and Riedl (2010), the study predicted a significant positive relationship between corporate 
governance and FRQ and between political influence and FRQ. Next, the following regression model was used 
to evaluate the influence of corporate governance structure and political influence on the FRQ of the banking 
sector listed under the Iraq Stock Exchange. The regression model stated as follows: 
FRQit     =  α0  + α1 BSit  + α2 BIit  +  α3 BDit + α4 AIit + α5 MOit  + α6 NOit  +  α7 PCit + α8LEVit  + α9FSit + εit          (1) 
Whereby, BS = board size; BI = board independence; BD = board gender diversity; AI= audit committee 
independence; OM = Managerial ownership; NO= institution ownership; PC= Political influence; LEV= 
leverage; and FS= firm size. Furthermore, the study included control variables that may influence the FRQ (firm 
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size and leverages). 
 
3.2. Measurement of the Variables 
Dependent Variable: the study measured FRQ through two models from past studies. Firstly, the measurement 
of FRQ by McNicholas’ (2002) model considered the standard deviation of the residuals as a measure of 
reporting quality. The bigger values of the model residual mean a considerable level of discretionary accrual and 
a poor quality financial report. The model is stated as follows: 
ACCRit     =  α0   + α1 CFit – 1 + α2 CFit  +  α3 CFit + 1 α4 ∆REVit + α5 PPEit  + εit                                                                                    (2) 
      TAit – 1      TAit – 1      TAit – 1       TAit – 1       TAit – 1        TAit – 1 
Whereby: ACCRit-1 as total current accruals; CFit as operating cash flows of the current period; CFit-1 as 
operating cash flows of the previous period; CFit+1; operating cash flows of the next period; REVit as the change 
in revenues and PPEit as the level of property, plant and equipment. The constructs are scaled by lag total assets 
(Tait-1). 
Secondly, the model captures the information content of earnings by Collins and Kothari (1989) and Ball and 
Brown (1968). Meanwhile, the stock return incorporates all the constructs information if the accounting incomes 
are informative, showing a good FRQ, as Ashbaugh, Collins, and LaFond (2006) indicated. Therefore, the high 
standard error of the residuals indicates poor quality of information. The model is stated as follows:  
RETit     =  α0  + α1EARNit  + α2 ∆EARNit  +  α3 NEGit + α4 EARNit * NEGit  + εit                                                                             (3) 
Whereby: RETit as annual stock returns of the current period; EARNit as net income/share of the current period; 
∆EARNit as the variation of earnings /share between ‘t-1’ and ‘t’; NEGit as binary construct equal to 1 provided 
that the firm makes a loss, otherwise 0; and EARNit * NEGit as the interaction between earnings/share and their 
signs. The study employed principal component analysis to examine the FRQ of the study sample better. 
Independent variables: the study employed Gallery, Hutchinson, Percy, and Erkurtoglu (2008) and Mbir et 
al.’s (2020) measurement to estimate the board size as the square number of board members (as the relationship 
of board size and FRQ is non-linear); board independence as a non-executive director to total directors; board 
gender diversity by the number of women on the board to the total board member; and audit committee 
independence as a non-executive member of the audit committee to the total number of the audit committee 
member, in line with Kukah et al. (2016). Based on Nelson and Devi (2013), the audit committee independence 
is measured by the number of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee to the total audit 
committee members. The measurement of both the dependent variables and independent variables are 
summarised in the Table 1: 
Table 1. Variables Measurement (Descriptions and Source) 
Variables Measurement Source 
FRQ Discretionary accrual deducted from total accrual of 
the company 
Annual report of listed 
firms 2015 – 2019 
Board Size Total number of board member Annual report of listed 
firms 2015 – 2019 
Board Independence The number of non-executive directors to total number 
of board size 
Annual report of listed 
firms 2015 – 2019 
Board Gender Diversity The proportion of women directors to the total number 
of board 
Annual report of listed 
firms 2015 – 2019 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
The proportion of outside directors to the total number 
of audit committee members 
Annual report of listed 
firms 2015 – 2019 
Managerial Ownership The square root of the percentage of the managerial 
ownership 
Annual report of listed 
firms 2015 – 2019 
Institution Ownership The square root of the percentage of the institutional 
ownership 
Annual report of listed 
firms 2015 – 2019 
Political Influence If there is a politician, it is one (1), otherwise, it is zero 
(0) 
Annual report of listed 
firms 2015 – 2019 
Leverage Long-term debt to total assets of the firm Annual report of listed 
firms 2015 – 2019 
Firm size Log of total assets Annual report of listed 
firms 2015 – 2019 
The companies in Iraq are classified according to the Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) for 2016 into nine 
categories based on the area of activities. These include banking sectors (34), insurance services (5), investment 
(9), tourism and hotel (10), money transfer (10), transportation, agriculture and industry (7). The study 
considered only the banking sector; Hence, the study population comprised the 34 banks listed under the ISX 
between 2015 to 2019. The banking service was considered due to the different regulations guiding the banks in 
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Iraq than other sectors. Furthermore, the study processed data using Stata version 15.0, using the random effect 
estimator based on Hausman tests. For the study to assess the model adequacy, multi-collinearity and joint 
significance were tested. Finally, the study analysed the impact of corporate governance and political influence 
on FRQ through regression analysis. 
 
4. Analysis and Interpretation of Findings 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The study considered mean and standard deviation as the descriptive statistics as this refer to the measure of 
central tendency and measure of dispersion. The mean refers to the average value of the dataset, whereas 
standard deviation refers to a measure that presents an index of variability in the dataset and is also known as the 
square root of variance. The results are shown in Table 2, the average value of the dependent variables FRQ is 
five years period, the mean value of the FRQ was indicated to be 8.5%, whereas the minimum and maximum 
values were 0.000 (0%) and 0.553 (55.3%).  
The results also suggested that institutional ownership was the highest among the Iraqi firms: ranging from 
zero (0) to 88%, with a mean of 52.5%, higher than Shayan and Özcebe (2017) with a mean of 32%. 
Additionally, the board size variable has a minimum of four members on the BOD and a maximum of 17 
members. The average size of the boards is 7, and the standard deviation of 2. For board gender diversity, 
women participation in the BOD has an average of 6.3%, with a minimum of 0% and maximum of 6%. The 
political connection and ownership structures were measured based on continuous variables. Table 3 shows the 
results of the descriptive statistics. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Constructs Mean SD Min Max 
FRQ 0.085 0.065 0.000 0.553 
Board Size (BS) 7.015 2.112 4.000 17.000 
Board Independence (BI) 0.215 0.175 0.000 0.130 
Board Gender Diversity (BD) 0.063 0.122 0.000 0.060 
Audit Committee Independence (AI) 0.240 0.150 0.010 0.810 
Managerial Ownership (MO) 0.110 0.151 0.000 0.926 
Institution Ownership (NO) 0.525 0.231 0.000 0.883 
Political Influence (PC) 0.558 0.523 0.000 4.000 
Leverage (LEV) 0.733 0.214 0.005 1.000 
Firm Size (FS) 14.871 1.889 10.213 20.221 
 
4.2. Correlation Analysis 
The correlation analysis was used to test multi-collinearity relationships between the constructs in the regression 
model. Mustapha, Rashid, Ado, and Ademola (2019) and Gujrati (2004) reported that the correlation could be 
proven if the r-value is 0.8 and above. Pallant (2011) stated that the correlation of 0 shows no relationship, 1.0 
indicates a positive relationship, whereas -1 is a perfect negative correlation. Besides, Cohen (1988) suggested 
the guidelines (r = 0.1 – 0.29 as small; r = 0.30 – 0.49 as medium; and r = 0.5 – 1.0 as large relationship). Table 
4 indicates that the constructs are significantly correlated as no constructs were above 0.9. Hence, the results 
showed no multi-collinearity problems as per Hair, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2021). 
Table 3. Correlation Analysis 
Constructs FRQ BS BI BD AI MO NO PC LEV FS 
FRQ 1.000          
BS .201** 1.000         
BI .202** .112* 1.000        
BD .040 .212* .030 1.000       
AI .079 .072 .101* -.039 1.000      
MO .081* .211** .092 .123** .045 1.000     
NO .044** .212* .083 .110* .141* .101* 1.000    
PC -.101* .026 .132** .338** -.088 .095 -.160* 1.000   
LEV .111* .340** .254* .057 .115 .213** .230** .170* 1.000  
FS .648** .200** .261* -.047 .181* .291** .361** .226** -.136* 1.000 
FRQ (FRQ); Board Size (BS); Board Independence (BI); Board Gender Diversity (BD); Audit Committee 
Independence (AI); Managerial Ownership (MO); Institution Ownership (NO); Political Influence (PC); 
Leverage (LEV); Firm Size (FS) 
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4.3. Regression Result and Testing of Hypotheses 
The model was tested using fixed-effect regression after running the Hausman test to select the appropriate 
method between a fixed effect and a random effect. Nevertheless, the R2 value is 0.422 (42%), suggesting the 
overall influence of corporate governance and political influence on FRQ in the model. Table 4 shows the results 
of the multiple regression analysis and hypotheses testing. 
Table 4. Multiple Regression Analysis Results 
FRQ Coef. SE t-value p-value 
Board Size (BS) .21211 .10400 2.039** .0120 
Board Independence (BI) .08640 .05964 1.450 .1531 
Board Gender Diversity (BD) .00055 .00130 .4230 .6920 
Audit Committee Independence (AI) .24021 .15032 1.598 .1006 
Managerial Ownership (MO) .10240 .05101 2.007** .0450 
Institution Ownership (NO) .12520 .23125 .5414 .1442 
Political Influence (PC) -.53030 .22315 -2.3764** .0321 
Leverage (LEV) .14612 .01023 10.174*** .0002 
Firm Size (FS) .00421 .00312 .86312 .3881 
Constants -1.5812 .19453 -8.134*** .0000 
R- Square .4220    
Prob. (F-statistic) .0008    
Hettest (Chi2) .4101    
Hausman Test (Chi2) .3302    
Observation(N) 170    
Note: ***p < 0.01 @1%; **p < 0.05 @5%; & *p < 0.01 @10% 
The results of the multiple regression for the board size showed a positive and significant relationship with 
FRQ as a 5% level of significance with a beta value of 21%. Hence, the significant positive value verified an 
increase in the board members increases the quality of financial reporting in line with the agency theory that 
proposed the increase in the board size anchors improves the FRQ (Al-Shaer, Salama, & Toms, 2017; Mishra & 
Malhotra, 2016; Ismail & Kamarudin, 2017). For board gender diversity, the study showed an insignificant 
relationship with the FRQ. Besides, board independence has an insignificant relationship with FRQ. Thus, the 
study revealed the negative contribution of the women on the BOD on the FRQ. The results confirmed that any 
number of women on the board would minimise the FRQ of the listed banks in the Iraq stock exchange. 
Therefore, the results contradicted with the study hypothesis and agency theory assumption (Mustapha et al., 
2019; Abdulmalik & Ahmad, 2016). 
Based on the audit committee independence, the study indicated a positive and insignificant relationship 
with FRQ. Hence, an increase of one member of non-executive independence will decrease reporting quality to 
mandate more external monitoring. Therefore, the study hypothesis is rejected and contradict with the proposed 
agency theory (Aanu, Odianonsen, & Taiwo, 2015). Based on the relationship between ownership structure and 
FRQ, managerial ownership showed a positive and significant relationship with the FRQ of listed banks in the 
Iraq stock exchange. Therefore, the significant positive value of the manager in ownership justified an increase 
in the monitoring and the FRQ, consistent with the agency theory verifying the increase on the managerial 
ownership anchor improvement on the FRQ.  
Meanwhile, the institutional ownership indicated an insignificant relationship with FRQ. Thus, the 
involvement of institutions in business ownership could reduce the FRQ. The study confirms (Mustapha et al., 
2019) who found an insignificant relationship with FRQ. For board members’ political influence, the results 
proved a significant negative relationship of board members with the political influence on FRQ. Therefore, the 
negative result of the political influence of some board members could negatively influence the organisation’s 
decision-making. The findings support the proposed theory of political influence model, whereby the political 
influence of board members has a negative influence on the performance of the FRQ of the listed banks in the 
Iraqi stock exchange.  
 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The study examined the impact of board effectiveness, ownership structure and political influence on FRQ of the 
Iraqi banking sector. Iraq is an emerging economy whereby corporate governance practices have been introduced 
to establish and maintain companies’ good quality corporate culture. Panel data was employed in the study and 
the Hausman test was used to select between fixed effect and random effect, whereby the fixed effect was 
selected because the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, the board size has a positive and significant relationship 
with FRQ in the sample firms analysis. Nonetheless, board independence and audit independence have an 
insignificant impact on FRQ. The Iraqi corporate governance manual does not define the role of the independent 
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non-executive directors explicitly. Besides, the study sample organisation have a high ratio of independent non-
executive to minimise the board independence. Equally, institutional ownership has no relationship with FRQ. 
The institution is interested in the reporting quality and they look after the company decisions. Nonetheless, 
institutional ownership has no influence on FRQ in both techniques employed to estimate the model. 
Interestingly, managerial ownership has a positive relationship with FRQ in accounting and market measures. 
Therefore, managerial and shareholder interests align when management ownership increases. Furthermore, the 
political influence of some members of the board has a negative impact on the FRQ. 
The results showed that the financial reporting system improves the quality of financial information and 
provides an enabling environment to the shareholders by adding value to their confidence to create more 
accurate decisions. The study recommends relevant banks in Iraq and worldwide to increase the good 
governance practices by boards, audit committees, ownership structure and political connection towards the FRQ 
and improve organisational performance. The study further suggested that future studies should be performed in 
other sectors as a comparison and generalise the study. Finally, new studies should be conducted to expand the 
time frame of the period of the study. 
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